The Battle of the Winter

23rd July 2007

One issue that intrigues me is how and why the British in Germany, after the war, transferred their efforts and energy from destruction to reconstruction.

One source which can give us an insight into this is the ‘British Zone Review’ the official publication of the British Military Government and Control Commission.

The first issue was published on 29th September 1945, nearly five months after the end of the war in Europe. In his introductory message on the front page, Field Marshal Montgomery, the Military Governor and Commander-in-Chief of British forces in Germany, spoke of entering the second phase of the occupation and how having won the war, his soldiers now had to fight a new battle to win the peace: the ‘Battle of the Winter.’

"Before launching my troops into battle it has always been my custom to issue to them a Personal Message…

Some time before hostilities came to an end in Europe five months ago, plans were being prepared for the post-war task, which may be summarised as the permanent eradication of Nazism, and the administration of Germany according to the principles which we hold to be right.

Before the task of reconstruction can be undertaken, the complicated machinery of a war making race has to be carefully pulled apart. Furthermore, twelve years of Nazi rule and nearly six years of war have resulted in more than material destruction.

For five months we have been clearing the ground, and the task of sweeping clean is still proceeding. As we approach its completion we shall be entering, in concert with our Allies, the second stage, the stage of reconstruction. Much of the responsibility for guiding and supervising this reconstruction rests with you. The defeated enemy must be made to put his house in order. He must learn to feed himself. Also he must be made to pay for the war which was of his making. At present he cannot sustain himself, far less repay what he owes. First he must be raised to his feet, and then made to work in such a way that he will not only be able to liquidate his debts but finally find his own salvation. We shall try to be wise conquerors. As we were strong in battle so we shall be just in peace.

You are here in Germany to help with the administration and reconstruction of the most ravaged country the world has known. On you will depend the shape of the future Germany."

The issues which concerned the British were simple: how to avoid starvation and disease, which could spread to the rest of Europe. Under the heading ‘Getting on with the Job’ Montgomery explained that:

"The objectives for the battle of the winter are food, work and homes. Of course, it is not quite so simple as that; everybody knows that a thousand other considerations are immediately involved, transport, raw materials, administration and , above all, coal."

Under the headline, ‘Will Germany starve this Winter: The problem of Feeding the British Zone’, the current German food ration of 1,550 calories was contrasted with the "lowest wartime civilian consumption in Britain" of about 2,800 calories, and described as "the minimum needed to forestall an economic and social collapse that would be as disastrous for Western Europe as a whole as it would be for Germany" as "epidemics need no passports."

On page 8 of the same issue, another article described the ‘Battle of the Winter’ in more detail, under the heading ‘Campaign against epidemics.’

"The war is over, but the Germans will receive a sharp reminder this winter that the terrors they unleashed in 1939 are not yet at an end. A demoralised people with inadequate housing, diet barely sufficient in some areas to prevent starvation, and little fuel for domestic heating, cannot hope to escape widespread misery and disease.

The Germans must fight the battle and bear the consequences, but in order to safeguard the occupying forces and to prevent Germany becoming a plague spot that would infect the whole of Europe we have to give whatever assistance is possible.

Unfortunately a serious strain has suddenly been thrown on this rather delicate structure. No sooner had the bulk of DPs been repatriated than a surge of hundreds of thousands of refugees threatened to pour in from the East – Germans turned out of Poland and Czechoslovakia, trekking westwards probably with little clothing and no food.

Quite apart from the general care of this mass of refugees, action must be taken to prevent them bringing fresh disease into our zone. The louse-borne scourge of typhus is a serious danger."

Germany in 1945 and Britain in 1967 as ‘super-Sweden’

14th July 2007

Some ideas seem to have a history of their own, appearing at different times in different circumstances.

A British Foreign Office document on ‘German reactions to defeat’ dated 2nd January 1945, included the following reference to ‘super-Sweden’ as a suitable role for Germany after the war:

"Germany must be encouraged to aim at being a super-Sweden, cleaner, better planned and healthier than any State ever was before, with better social, medical and educational services and a higher standard of living than any State ever had."

Encouraging Germany to become a ‘super-Sweden’, implied that the country could become prosperous, with an excellent welfare system, perhaps even a socialist government, but would have no military capability, no diplomatic influence, and should stay well clear of any possible future conflict between a communist and totalitarian East (ie the Soviet Union and Eastern European satellite states) and an individualistic and democratic West, (ie the US, Britain and Western Europe), much as Sweden had remained neutral throughout World War Two.

Last week I attended a conference on Britain and Europe in the 20th Century, and was surprised to hear a similar reference to ‘greater Sweden’, in a paper given by Helen Carr from the University of Keele, on events which took place more than twenty years later: Britain’s second application to join the European Community in 1967.

Helen Carr described how a senior official in the British Foreign Office had written a paper outlining three foreign policy options for Britain: subservience to the United States, joining the European Community, and ‘go it alone’ which was also described as the ‘Greater Sweden’ option.

The same role, of becoming a ‘super-Sweden’, which the British Foreign Office had considered right for Germany after the war, was now dismissed as undesirable for Britain in 1967, as it meant giving up a world role and the ability to influence the affairs of other countries. This was unthinkable at a time when officials in the Foreign Office and British Governments in general, both Labour and Conservative, still thought of Britain, which had only recently lost its empire, as a great power in the world.

At first I thought these two references to ‘super-Sweden’ and ‘greater Sweden’ were pure coincidence, but it then turned out that both Foreign Office papers, in 1945 and 1967, were written by the same person, Sir Con O’Neill, who was to become head of the German section of the Foreign Office and then, twenty years later, played a leading role in the British applications to join the European Community.

Does this tell us anything about British foreign policy and the mindset of Foreign Office officials? I am no expert on the British applications to join the European Community, but the 1945 paper on ‘German reactions to defeat’ is reprinted in full in a book which I have read, published in 1997: ‘Conditions of Surrender: Britains and Germans witness the end of the war’ edited by Ulrike Jordan. The paper is also discussed in an article in the book by the German historian Lothar Kettenacker, titled  ‘British Post-war Planning for Germany: Haunted by the Past.’

It is clear from reading the full paper, that Con O’Neill was already equating National Socialism in Germany with Communism in the Soviet Union, at a time when the war was not yet over, when Russia was an ally of Britain and the US, without whose support winning the war against Nazi Germany would have been far more difficult, if not impossible. His concern was that there would be a revival of German militarism, and that Germans were somehow naturally inclined, by national character and instinct, to become allied with the communist East, rather than the democratic West.

This seems strange in many ways, as for the previous three years Goebbels had been loudly publicising the view that the British and Americans should cooperate with the Germans in mutual defence against ‘Bolshevism’. The same line was taken by the short lived German interim government of Admiral Dönitz. In a speech on 1st May 1945, after saying that "The Führer has appointed me as his successor" Dönitz continues: "It is my first task to save the German people from destruction by the advancing Bolshevik enemy. For this aim alone the military struggle continues." On 2nd May the foreign secretary in the Dönitz government, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, expressed the same views in a speech on Germany as a ‘Bulwark against Bolshevism’. This included one of the first references to an ‘iron curtain’. "In the east, the iron curtain is advancing even further, behind which the work of annihilation proceeds hidden from the eyes of the world."

As Lothar Kettenacker said in his article in the book: "Apparently it did not occur to British officials that the Germans were not at all inclined to trust the Russians, whose land they had devastated, or the Bolsheviks, against whom Goebbels had railed for the last three years."

Here is an extract from the 1945 paper by Con O’Neill. It shows how common it was for British diplomats and Foreign Office officials to think in terms of national stereotypes, their anthropomorphic tendency to attribute personal characteristics to countries, and how the actions of the government of a country were explained in terms of the supposed instincts and beliefs of the people as a whole.

"National Socialism had been no more than a special form of organization of the instincts and capacities of the German people. Other forms of totalitarian organisation almost equally unpleasant and effective may occur, for those instincts and capacities will remain largely what they are….

Moreover, future German recollections of this war will not all be tinged with defeat and disaster. Just as vividly they will remember how near they came to victory. They will remember the battles they won, the countries they struck down, the heroes who led them in success of perished in the hour of seeming triumph… Nothing will stop the Germans from believing they had the finest army in the world, and succumbed only to superiority in numbers and material. Nothing will stop them taking pride in their accomplishments in a pursuit which they so manifestly excel. Nothing, finally, will stop them wishing to re-create armed forces when they have been deprived of them…

To say that National Socialism is unlikely to remain, or become again, a popular creed in Germany does not mean that Germany is likely to become democratic. Germany will once again have the choice – or so it might seem – between the ideals of the West and of the East, between an individualist and a collectivist system.

An attempt may now be made to answer the question: would Germany, in another war crisis, be found on the side of the East or the West? Circumstances can alter in any case. But if German inclinations and calculations are to determine the matter, then the answer must be as pessimistic as most of the other conclusions so far arrived at in this paper, Germany will be found on the side of the East, because her political and social ideas and instincts will align her with the East rather than the West….

Germany must be encouraged to aim at being a super-Sweden, cleaner, better planned and healthier than any State ever was before, with better social, medical and educational services and a higher standard of living than any State ever had."

With hindsight we know that nothing came of the ‘super-Sweden’ idea. Germany was divided into the Bundesrepublik in the West, closely allied with Britain and the US in NATO, and the DDR in the East, closely allied with the Soviet Union. It is therefore all the more intriguing to find the same idea cropping up twenty years later, in another paper written by the same person, but this time as an undesirable option for Britain, instead of a desirable role for Germany.

As a postscript, I attended a lecture a year ago given by Timothy Garton Ash, who said that the same idea, this time described as ‘offshore Switzerland’ rather than ‘super-Sweden’, was now seen as a highly attractive option for Britain, among some of those on the right of British politics who were advocating leaving the European Union. Sweden itself, of course, is still prosperous, but joined the EU in 1995.

‘Winning the peace’: Germany under British occupation, as portrayed in Humphrey Jennings’ film ‘A Defeated People’ and the ‘British Zone Review’.

Next Thursday 12th July, I will be giving a paper at the Centre for Contemporary British History (CCBH) annual summer conference, on Britain and Europe in the Twentieth Century.

Here is a copy of my paper. Next week I hope to write about any comments and questions
from those attending the conference.

‘Winning the peace’: Germany under British occupation, as portrayed in
Humphrey Jennings’ film ‘A Defeated People’ and the ‘British Zone
Review’

At the end of the First World War crowds in the streets in London were calling for the government to ‘Hang the Kaiser’. In more recent times Anglo-German relations are often trivialised as being about football hooliganism, towels on the beach and Fawlty Towers. At the end of the Second World War things were very different, and more serious, as British soldiers and administrators in occupied Germany struggled to cope, as best they could, with the challenge of winning the peace after winning the war; of occupying a country they had just defeated in battle; and of governing a country where the physical infrastructure had been destroyed and the existing political, social and moral frameworks had collapsed.

The British knew only too well that, although the military conflict was over, their job had only just begun. On 4th May 1945, after receiving the unconditional surrender of German forces in North West Germany, Holland and Denmark on Lüneburg Heath, Field Marshall Montgomery issued a personal message to the troops under his command, in which he said: ‘We have won the German war. Let us now win the peace.’ This message was repeated many times in the months which followed.

As there was no German government in existence any more, the British now ruled an area half the size of their own country with direct responsibility for a population of over 20 million people. With the self-confidence engendered by victory, many people expected that the occupation would last 25 years or more. Contemporary sources frequently refer to the scale and importance of  the task: “…an enterprise of great magnitude and difficulty for which there is indeed no precedent in human history” as J B Hynd, the minister responsible for Germany, said in his speech at the opening of the London exhibition ‘Germany under Control’, in June 1946. 

In this paper I intend to show how the attitudes of many British soldiers and administrators in Germany changed in the first year of the occupation, in the transition from war to peace, with particular reference to Humphrey Jennings’ documentary film ‘A Defeated People’. I’ll also refer to two other sources, the exhibition ‘Germany under Control,’ and the British Zone Review, the official fortnightly review of the activities of the British Control Commission for Germany and Military Government.

These were all official sources, and were all sponsored by either the Ministry of Information, or the British Military Government and Control Commission for Germany, or both. They therefore show, not only a personal view of the film’s director, the exhibition organisers, or the Review’s contributors, but an official British view of Germany after the war, in the first few months of Occupation.

Firstly, I would like to set the scene by describing some contrasting British attitudes to Germany and the German people at the end of the war. Attitudes in Britain are well documented by Mass Observation surveys, Gallup opinion polls and general press comment, and show that opinion hardened during the course of the war, moving from general agreement with Chamberlain’s much quoted speech on 1st September 1939 that: “We have no quarrel with the German people except that they allow themselves to be governed by a Nazi Government,” to outright hostility and a belief in the collective guilt of an entire nation. This change started as early as the Norwegian campaign in 1940, when the BBC was instructed to abandon making any distinction between Nazis and Germans, grew stronger throughout the war as people reacted to the bombing of civilians and reports of atrocities; and culminated with the newsreel films of the concentration camps shown very widely in Britain in April and May 1945. To quote historian Nicholas Pronay, writing about how a defeated Germany was presented in British newsreels: “Any lingering doubts about the thesis of the collective guilt of a whole nation were … crushed at the end of April by the footage from the concentration camps.” From now on, according to Pronay, even when German people after the war were shown as suffering and in distress, this was always presented in the context of a collectively guilty people getting their just deserts.

Similar attitudes were shown in a US training film, ‘Your Job in Germany’, originally made in 1944 by the noted director, Frank Capra, and first released in April 1945. The film was designed to be shown to troops immediately following footage from the concentration camps. The message of the film to the US soldier entering German territory for the first time was to be suspicious: “You’ll see some mighty pretty scenery. Don’t let it fool you. You are in enemy country. Be alert, suspicious of everyone. Take no chances. You are up against more than tourist scenery. You are up against German history. It isn’t good.” Somewhere in this Germany there were still SS guards, Gestapo guards, thousands of storm troopers, two million Nazi officials, and most dangerous of all, German youth. To pictures of apparently friendly, smiling people, the commentator says: “You are not being sent into Germany as educators … Every German is a potential source of trouble. Therefore there must be no fraternisation with any of the German people. Fraternisation means making friends. The German people are not our friends. You will not associate with German men, women or children. They’re not sorry they caused the war, just sorry they lost it.”

In contrast with these public and official attitudes in Britain and also in the US, as British soldiers and administrators in Germany came face to face with individual German people, and saw the scale of the destruction in the cities, far worse than anything they had experienced at home, they grappled with two contrasting emotions – should they leave the Germans to ‘stew in their own juice’ even if that meant that possibly millions would die of starvation, or should they feel pity for the suffering of the former enemy, and do what they could to alleviate it.

This was no academic discussion. Before he left London, General Templer, director of Civil Affairs for the British 21st Army Group, was told by PJ Grigg, Secretary of State for War, that: “You must resign yourself to the fact that two million are going to die of hunger in Europe this spring. You and the Army must do all you can to mitigate it, but you won’t be able to cure it.”

Field Marshal Montgomery, the British commander-in-chief was equally aware of his responsibilities. He tells in his memoirs how, following the unconditional surrender on 4th May 1945: “I had suddenly become responsible for the government and well-being of about twenty million Germans. Tremendous problems would be required to be handled and if they were not solved before the winter began, many Germans would die of starvation, exposure and disease.”

In the event, in the British Zone, despite widespread hunger and appalling living conditions, relatively few people did die of starvation and disease as, almost overnight, the British army and Military Government, transferred their attentions from destruction to re-construction, with equal energy and determination. In the former German Eastern territories, of course, it was a different story. The number of people who died as a result of the expulsion of around 12 million ethnic Germans from the East is a highly contentious topic, but was certainly substantial. Estimates vary from around 500,000 to nearly 3 million.

In the words of Noel Annan, political adviser to the British Military government, “Templer’s energy transformed the British zone.” The British Official History of the war tells the same story, of how Templer, “more than any other man saved the zone from famine and anarchy through the desperate winter of 1945-6.” Equally remarkable, the author of the official history concludes his work with a personal impression
. Although many of the regular officers he spoke to at first disliked a posting to Civil Affairs, many from Templer downwards: “made it very clear to the writer that by the time their connection with military government was to be severed, they had come to feel it was the most rewarding work they had ever undertaken.” One officer even said it was “the only really worth while thing he ever did in his life.”

‘A Defeated People’

I’d now like to return to the film, ‘A Defeated People’ and examine in more detail what it can tell us about the complex and varied, often confused and contradictory nature of British policy and attitudes to Germany in the first year of the occupation; bearing in mind that this was an official film, designed to show people at home what life was really like in Germany.

The film was made shortly after the end of the war, in the Autumn and Winter of 1945, by the Crown Film Unit, part of the Ministry of Information. The film’s director, Humphrey Jennings was probably the greatest of all the British wartime documentary film makers. Angus Calder, for example, in ‘The Myth of the Blitz’ refers to him as “Britain’s most remarkable maker of official films.” His wartime films include well known classics such as London can Take It, Listen to Britain and Fires were Started, the last of which has been described by the film historian Jeffrey Richards as “one of the key works in creating the mythic image of the London Blitz. Those heroic figures silhouetted against the blazing inferno sweeping the dockside warehouse etched themselves into history, embodying the epic of the ordinary men and women who calmly and courageously took up the defence of their city.” 

His films were remarkably popular, at a time when film was still a mass medium, and the British documentary film movement was at its peak. In 1946, at the height of its popularity, a third of the population visited the cinema at least once a week. In addition to cinema showings, the Ministry of Information arranged so called non-theatrical film shows in factories, village halls and clubs, reaching an audience of twenty million people over a two and a half year period. In the heightened emotional atmosphere of wartime, these non-theatrical audiences sometimes wept, or broke out into spontaneous applause, when they saw Jennings’ films. Helen Forman, who was second in charge of the non-theatrical distribution section of the Films division of the Ministry of Information, wrote that: “One of the … films … which was liked and applauded was Humphrey Jennings’ magical Listen to Britain. All sorts of audiences felt it to be a distillation and also a magnification of their own experience of the home front.”

It is therefore intriguing to ask what did this Englishmen, who created the mythic image of the London Blitz, and whose audiences felt his films were a distillation and magnification of their own experiences, make of Germany after the war.

The picture his film ‘A Defeated People’ shows of Germany after the war is grim. It shows not only the physical destruction at the end of the war, but its effect on the people, who were shown as stunned, dazed, as if they didn’t know what had hit them. In the words of the commentary: “Place and time meant nothing, because the people; the links between the people, were smashed too. They were just left wandering, looking for food, looking for their homes, looking for each other.”

Nicholas Pronay, the historian of British newsreels, has argued that the left-wing idealist documentary film makers in general, and  Humphrey Jennings’ film ‘A Defeated People,’ in particular, presented the same image of Germany after the war, that of a guilty people getting its just deserts, as the right wing commercial newsreels and this reflected a basic consensus in Britain about Germany. 

The thesis of my paper today is that Pronay may have been right about the newsreels but was wrong about Humphrey Jennings and his film ‘A Defeated People.’ While the script of the film tells one story, the images show a different and more complex picture. On the one hand, the voice-over commentary, accompanied by pictures of destroyed cities, factories and bridges, has no hesitation in blaming the Germans for “the war they started.” But the images also show German people as individuals, not as a collectively guilty nation; men and women looking for lost relatives, children playing in the rubble on the bomb sites, people living underground in cellars because that’s all that remains of their houses, old women sawing up logs to take home for fuel because they have no coal.

Not only, I would argue, has Pronay misunderstood the film, but he has also underplayed several important and contrasting aspects of the British view of Germany and the German people after the war, which are clearly evident in the film: firstly, awe at the scale of destruction they saw all around them, secondly, the energy and determination with which the British Military Government tackled the process of reconstruction; thirdly, their perceived need to explain to people back home that that they were doing this out of self-interest, not altruism, to prevent disease and prevent a resurgence of fascism which could lead to another war; fourthly, the unquestioned belief of the British in their own superiority and moral self-righteousness; and fifthly, and this is perhaps the most surprising aspect of the film, sympathy with the undoubted suffering of the former enemy, recognition that life goes on in the midst of destruction, and hope for the future.

What evidence is there to support this case? Of course we can watch the film, but as with all visual materials, we have to do this critically and question its value as historical evidence, because, especially when referring to images rather than the script, we are dealing with a work of art and different people will respond to it in different ways. When we watch the film now, our reactions may tell us more about our own personal experience and beliefs, and about popular memories in the society in which we grew up, than what were the original intentions of the director, or whether the film reflected official policy or popular attitudes at the time it was made.

Fortunately there is other evidence available. Firstly when the film was first shown in London in March 1946, it was extensively reviewed by the Press, which helps us understand how it was perceived when it was first released. Secondly, while filming in Germany in September and October 1945,  Jennings wrote a number of  letters to his wife and these provide an indication of his state of mind, his reactions to what he saw in Germany and the ideas he intended to convey in the film. And thirdly, we can compare how certain themes were treated in the film, with the presentation of similar themes and images in other historical sources, such as the exhibition ‘Germany under Control’ and the ‘British Zone Review’.

What the film reviews said in 1946

The film was first shown to the public at the Tivoli cinema in London on March 17th 1946, after a private press showing earlier in the week. It was reviewed in all the major papers, including The Times, Manchester Guardian, Glasgow Herald, Daily Mail, Daily Express, News Chronicle, Daily Telegraph, Daily Worker, Sunday Dispatch, Sunday Times, Sunday Express and Reynolds News.

The publicity material for the film stated that, as the “first official film record of life in Berlin and Hamburg under the British Control Commission,” it would answer the question everyone was asking: “What is it like inside Germany today?” It would show the scale of the destruction, but also how a curl of smoke emerging from the rubble showed someone, still living in the cellar of a destroyed building, was trying to make a home out o
f chaos. The role of the British Control Commission was stressed in bringing order out of ruin and despair. And in the final sentence, there was a glimmer of hope for the future as, “In the wintry sunlight the children are beginning to laugh and dance again, the horrors of war behind them.”

The reviews in all the papers, regardless of their political persuasion, were universally favourable and followed much the same line as the publicity material. It had been a week in which there was a shortage of good new feature films and the News Chronicle said: “it is left to documentaries again to bring weight and dignity to the week’s screen.” According to the Daily Worker: “the most important film of the week is A DEFEATED PEOPLE” and Reynolds News agreed that this was a “documentary film you must see.”

Some reviewers, such as the Daily Telegraph saw in the film a clear expression of sympathy: “A DEFEATED PEOPLE, made by Humphrey Jennings for the Crown Film Unit, gives a picture of life in the British Zone of Germany all the more impressive for its restraint. The tone is agreeably free from gloating, and it would need a much more vindictive race than ours to see without sympathy women cooking amid the ruins and crowds studying huge boards covered with the names of missing persons.” In summary, the reviewers recognised that the situation in Germany was grim, that conditions were bad and people were suffering. The British, as the occupying power,  had an obligation to do something about this, but there was no single answer and no easy solutions. As Joan Lester said in her review in Reynolds News, the film dealt with “the vital and complex problems arising out of the economic, political and human tangle created by Nazism in defeat. Mr Jennings has, within certain essential limitations of time and opportunity, brought to his subject understanding, intelligence and humanity.”

Humphrey Jennings’ letters to his wife while filming in Germany

Humphrey Jennings’ own reactions to the situation in Germany are revealed in the letters he wrote to his wife in September and October 1945. These show that he was initially confused and uncertain what to make of it. In his first letter, written on September 1st, he says:

“Well I have been quite overwhelmed by Germany in the past few days and can’t really say anything sensible yet – it is quite unlike anything one has been told or thought – both more alive and more dead.”

A week later he was still none the wiser:

“I am still unable to give any sort of reliable picture of Germany – even of the bits (Cologne, Essen, Hannover, Hamm) which we have seen – for the moment the contradictions are too great …”

Jennings’ mixed, complex and uncertain reactions, were perhaps best expressed in a letter he wrote on 10th September. I would like to quote from this at some length, because it illustrates both his eye for visual detail and his attempts to make sense of what he saw. Many of the sights he describes in this letter, appear as images in the film:

“At lunchtime today we were photographing a [German] family cooking their lunch on campfires in dixies on the blitzed main stair-case of the Palace of Justice at Cologne – one of the few buildings still standing in the centre of the city – outside apparently deserted – surrounded by miles of rubble and weed-covered craters – but inside voices cries of children and the smell of drifting wood-smoke – of burnt paper – the sound of people smashing up doors and windows to light fires in the corridors – the smoke itself drifting into side rooms still littered with legal documents – finally adding to the blue haze in front of the cathedral. The cathedral now with all the damage round immensely tall – a vast blue and unsafe spirit ready to crumble upon the tiny black figures in the street below … and then returning to Duesseldorf – much less knocked about – blitzed but not actually destroyed like Cologne and Essen and Aachen – still a beautiful city, returning here to tea we meet sailing through the park-like streets a mass of white Sunday-frocked German school children standing tightly together on an Army truck and singing at the tops of their voices as they are rushed through the streets  … In Essen they still fetch their water from stand-pipes and firehose in the streets and the sewers rush roaring and stinking open to the eye and the nose – seep into blitzed houses into cellars where people still live.

“Once no doubt Germany was a beautiful country and still remembers it on summer evenings in the country. For the people themselves they are willing enough or servile enough or friendly enough according to your philosophy of History and the German problem. They certainly don’t behave guilty or beaten. They have their old fatalism to fall back on: ‘Kaput’ says the housewife finding the street water pipe not working … and then looks down the streets and says ‘Kaputt … alles ist kaput.’ Everything … how right – but absolutely no suggestion that it might be their fault – her fault. ‘Why’ asks another woman fetching water ‘why do not you help us?’ ‘You’ being us. At the same time nothing is clearer straight away than that we cannot – must not leave them to stew in their own juice … well anyway it’s a hell of a tangle.”

This is not the uncompromising view, claimed by Pronay, as the consensus in Britain, of a guilty people getting its just deserts. There is no doubt in Jennings’ mind that the Germans were to blame for the war, but he also clearly is looking beyond this to the plight of people as individuals, to the obligations of the British as occupiers, and even to a Germany that once was a beautiful country, and might become so again.

The British Zone Review.

It is interesting to compare how these themes, revealed in the film, were handled in the British Zone Review, the official fortnightly review of the activities of the British Control Commission. Not surprisingly, the same themes which emerge in the film appeared in numerous articles in the early issues of the publication:

As one example, I’d like to quote from an article in the first issue, dated 29th September 1945, which described what the British had already achieved in the small town of Buxtehude, near Hamburg. Using the familiar image of life in Germany as a broken clock, the article tells the story of “what Military Government has done and is doing to restore to the British Zone the essential things of life which were swept away in the collapse of Nazi Germany….”

The article continues:

“When the British 213 Military Detachment took over the Nazi-run town on May 10, Buxtehude was like a clock with its spring unwound. There was no gas, and there was no electricity. The water was impure. The town’s small industries were at a standstill. The flour mills were idle. Road transport had stopped, and no trains ran. Today the Nazi bosses are gone, and the town has a Burgomeister, a social democrat, who was three times imprisoned by them. The public services have been restored. Trains are running, and there is a daily bus for those who have passes to say that their journeys are really necessary… How have these things happened?

‘It has just been part of the drill for dealing with such problems’, a British Army officer … told me. ‘The German people have been obedient and cooperative. We have told them what they must do and they have got on with the job.’”

A long running series on “The Price of War” catalogued the devastation in most of the major cities in the British Zone, followed by the work being done to put things right again. In article after article similar themes appear – awed descriptions of the scale and extent of the damage, usually caused by RAF bombing, followed by descriptions of the work being done by the British to repair it.

Other articles in the Review explained why reconstruction was in their own self interest. Chief of these was the fear of disease and unrest. “Epidemics need no passports” as Montgomery had said in his introductory message in the first issue; the economic and social collapse of Germany would be “as disastrous for Western Europe as a whole as it would be for Germany”.

The British in Germany clearly felt their work of reconstruction was not fully appreciated. The lead article in issue number 6, titled ‘For Those at Home’ spoke in almost biblical terms of the need to ensure that all those at home understood the enormity of the task: “The truth is that mere words and pictures cannot convey to those at home the enormity of the disaster that Germany has reaped. It must be seen and felt. …. Many of us returning from leave have remarked with some bitterness ‘They don’t seem to realise the problems we are up against.’

We must preach the gospel of information by every means …” the article continued “What sort of picture do they have in England of Germany, British Zone? London, at the height of the blitz, was well-nigh a land of plenty compared with life today in Dortmund, Munster, Hannover, Hamburg or Cologne … The mind reels when it attempts to assess the proportions of the problem…”    

But if the need for reconstruction was obvious, if unappreciated by those at home,  the same article went on to say that: “These pitifully inadequate pen-pictures which have many omissions, are not drawn in any attempt to win sympathy for the German … Sympathy for the Germans does not exist for us; our job is to see facts and evaluate them. Having helped to win the war we must strive to win the peace.”

Was it acceptable to feel sorry for the enemy or not? An extensive debate on the issue, under the headline, ‘Feeling sorry for the Germans’, was conducted in the letters pages of the Review, over five issues, from 13th October to 8th December 1945, with correspondents expressing a wide range of views.  I’d like to conclude my talk by quoting from the letter which started the debate from ‘Lucia Lawson, Subaltern, A.T.S.’

“In writing this I am probably bringing a storm of criticism down on my head, but I do not think that I am alone in my views. And I would be interested to know.

Some time ago I went to Berlin, prepared to experience the greatest satisfaction of my life, by seeing the town in ruins and the people with no place to live. I came away feeing sorry for some of the Germans …

You will say that those sweet little children with curly fair hair and blue eyes are all potential killers, but with their spindly legs and lips just turning blue from lack of food it is hardly in human nature to hate them. The old man and woman who I saw digging for tree roots in the ruins of the Tiergarten for food, surely deserve a little pity, or do they? The young girl dressed in a thin summer frock who I found sleeping under the shelter of a pile of rubble in the Kaiser Wilhelm church, is she to be hated too? Hundreds are now dying from starvation and disease. In a couple of months the number may easily be doubled.

Well, it is open to discussion, but think before you write, or get someone who has been to Berlin to tell you what conditions are like. Maybe I am too sensitive and soft hearted, but I still say I am sorry for some of them.”

Conclusion

To sum up, British policy and planning for Germany after the war is often described in terms of four D-words, denazification, decentralisation, demilitarisation and democratisation. To these are sometimes added another four D-words: destruction, disarmament, dismantling and dismemberment. But if this typifies the largely negative official policy of the British, the US, the Soviet Union and later France towards Germany, at the diplomatic level, as discussed and agreed at the numerous three and four power summits held during the war and afterwards at Potsdam, it is incomplete, even misleading, as a description of the policy, attitudes and activities of the British Military Government and personnel directly responsible for the occupation. These were often very different, and were determined, not by the official Four Power policy as agreed at Potsdam, but by their direct experience on the ground.

This paper has aimed to show that the film ‘A Defeated People’ and the ‘British Zone Review’ reveal other aspects of British policy and actions in Germany during the transition from war to peace, which are neglected or underplayed by those historians focussing on the high politics of the period. Firstly the uncertain and complex reaction of the British to the destruction they saw all around them; secondly the surprising energy and determination with which the British in Germany tackled the process of reconstruction; and thirdly despite the many voices both in Britain and Germany, expressing the view that the former enemy were a collectively guilty people receiving their just deserts, there was another strand of opinion, which showed sympathy with the undoubted suffering of  people as individuals, recognition that life goes on in the midst of destruction, and hope for the future. In summary, reconstruction not destruction and reconciliation not revenge.

The exhibition: ‘Germany under Control’

2nd July 2007

The official exhibition ‘Germany under Control’, sponsored by the British Ministry of Information, was formally opened in London on June 7th 1946, three months after Humphrey Jennings’ film, ‘A Defeated People’ (see earlier postings) received its first showing.

I wrote about this exhibition on 1st October and 11th October last year (2006). Since then I’ve found out some more about it from a number of files in the National Archives.

The exhibition was held in London on a large site on Oxford Street, which had been used the previous year for another Ministry of Information exhibition: ‘Victory over Japan‘. This ran for four months from August to December 1945 and had attracted huge crowds – over one and a half million in total, more than 10,000 people per day on average. Perhaps they were attracted by the heat, as the temperature inside was kept at 120 degrees (Fahrenheit), to simulate conditions in the jungle. To quote The Times report on August 21st, visitors could also experience "giant cobwebs [brushing] against the face as one passes, and spiders, the size of a man’s hand, are seen curled up in the web. One hears the sound of running water, the noise of insects and the wails of jackals and hyenas."

‘Germany under Control’ was altogether more serious. Although it never achieved the huge numbers attending the Japan exhibition, a total of 220,000 people visited it in the two months it was open between June and August 1946. On Whit Monday bank holiday on June 10th it was attended by over 9,000 people and at one point the queue of people waiting to get in built up to over 500.

The idea for the exhibition came originally from the British Military Government and Control Commission in Germany, in a letter dated 27th December 1945 signed by General Templer, on behalf of Brian Robertson, the deputy Military Governor, in which the aim of the exhibition is stated as: "the enlightening of the British public in regard to the problems and tasks of the Control Commission for Germany" and so meeting the demand in Britain, from both members of Parliament and the general public, for more information about what was going on in Germany under British occupation, at the end of the war.

Originally the proposed date for the opening was March 28th, as this would coincide with financial provision for the Control Commission for the new financial year, starting in April. This shows that the cost of the occupation was already a sensitive issue, well before Hugh Dalton, Chancellor of the Exchequer, revealed in the Budget debate on 9th April 1946 that the estimated cost for the coming year would be £80 million, and went on to say that this meant that Britain was in effect paying reparations to Germany, instead of the other way round.

Subsequent discussions within the Control Office for Germany and Austria, (known as COGA) the UK based arm of the Control Commission, which had taken on responsibility for organising the exhibition, show officials expressing concerns as to how the story should be presented to the British public, in particular why should the British taxpayer pay to put Germany on its feet again. For example, in a memo to Sir Arthur Street, the Permanent Secretary, regarding the name to be given to the exhibition, Group Captain Houghton, Director of Information Services, wrote that: "The show will largely illustrate the steps which are being taken to reconstruct and govern. But we must not use slogans like ‘Germany Today’ or ‘The New Germany’, since the public … may form wrong opinions." The answer, he believed was that: "The British public must be told they will directly profit from what we are doing in Germany."

These tensions between grand and worthy objectives, and practical concerns at the public’s reaction were never resolved.

Logistical issues meant that the opening was delayed until 7th June 1946, the day before a Victory Parade in London celebrating one year since Victory in Europe. In his speech opening the exhibition, in front of an audience of 3,000 people at the Dominion Theatre, including Mayors and Mayoresses of London Borough in their full regalia and other distinguished guests, J B Hynd, the minister responsible for Germany, highlighted the scale and importance of the task: "…an enterprise of great magnitude and difficulty for which there is indeed no precedent in human history … It is therefore, in the beginning a costly job, but investment for peace is better, and infinitely cheaper than investment for war, and the work we are doing is no less than a great, perhaps final, effort to establish conditions in which the world may be freed from the menace of war forever."

An earlier article in the Evening Standard on 25th April, promoting the exhibition, was less high minded. This stated simply that the exhibition "aims at showing to the British taxpayer that his money in Germany is being well spent" and mentioned a number of specific exhibits including; a comparison of British and German food rations, pots and pans made Wehrmacht helmets to illustrate the theme of ‘swords into ploughshares’ and a small box containing locks of hair from figures in German history  including Henry the Lion and his English wife Mathilda. These had been disinterred in secret in by the Nazis in 1935, and were subsequently found by the British to have been originally black, but died blond by the Nazis.

The British official responsible for the exhibition wrote wryly to a colleague, in an internal memo enclosing the cutting: "To get the maximum of linage, you will understand that we will have to approach the affair from different angles. In the process, a certain amount of dignity, I am afraid, must be sacrificed, but I think we should get the required result."

Official British policy was now shifting, almost exactly one year after Victory in Europe (VE) Day, looking towards ending the occupation sooner rather than later. The draft text of a leaflet given to all attendees at the exhibition was changed to reflect this. The concluding paragraph of the original draft text expressed similar sentiments to Hynd’s speech at the opening: "We are going to ensure that Germany does not again make war on us. We are going to convert the British Zone from a liability into an asset. We are going to maintain a Control Commission in Germany until we have attained these aims." In the printed version, the final paragraphs read very differently, looking forward to the time when the British would leave: "The Germans know best how to solve Germany’s difficult problems. It must be our constant aim to make the Germans run their own affairs. If we fail to do this, we shall leave chaos behind us when we go. For we are not going to remain in Germany indefinitely. We must therefore train the Germans to govern themselves on the lines which we believe to be right, gradually and cautiously transferring more and more responsibility to them."

The British public was turning inwards. No longer as interested in the big issues of how to prevent another war, or prepared to take on the responsibilities and burdens of reconstructing, re-educating and democratising Germany, their main concerns were more practical and down to earth. The most popular exhibit at the exhibition was a comparison of British and German ration scales, with models of each in glass cases, complete with calorific values. In a review after the first two weeks, the exhibition organisers expressed concern at the reactions of the visitors, some of whom thought the Germans were getting too much, and the British not enough, because they did not read the captions correctly and thought the larger British ration was actually the smaller German ration, and vice versa. This has remained a persistent myth. (See my earlier postings on Bread Rationing in Britain). No longer prepared to take on and solve the problems of the world, the British now complained about austerity at home and how much worse off they thought they were than their neighbours.

Alec Cairncross – The Price of War and A Country to Play With

24th June 2007

Last week I wrote about the Level of Industry Negotiations, which took place in Berlin from September 1945 until the end of March 1946, as described in the book ‘Berlin Reparations Assignment‘, written by two members of the US delegation, B U Ratchford and Wm D Ross.

Sir Alec Cairncross was the economic adviser to the British delegation. He later became a distinguished economist, economic historian and Chancellor of Glasgow University. His book ‘The Price of War’ published in 1986, is a history of the negotiations from the British perspective. A second book ‘A Country to Play With’ published a year later in 1987, is a more personal account of his own role.

Cairncross’s description of the absurd nature of the negotiations, and how the agreement was discarded almost as soon as it was reached, is very similar to that of Ratchford and Ross. On being asked to take on the job, he says: "It seemed to me as plain as a pikestaff after a three week’s visit to Germany in July 1945 that any sensible man, asked what industrial plant was surplus to the requirements of a peaceful Germany was bound to give the short answer: ‘None’."

He describes his frustration as his expert economic advice was discarded by the political negotiators, and the agreement finally reached, on Steel production levels in particular, ignored all his carefully gathered statistical evidence. On the plan as a whole he comes to the conclusion: "that the Plan itself was utterly unrealistic seems obvious enough in retrospect." The finally agreed levels of industry were "neither consistent nor coherent…. They were the outcome of a bargaining process in which each decision was unrelated to the others and the resulting jumble could not be assumed to make any sense whatever. Nobody could say what the German standard of living would work out at, or whether Germany would achieve a level of exports sufficient to pay for the imports required at that level, or how many Germans would be unemployed. There was no real agreement even on the size of the German population. There was open disagreement whether reparations could be taken from the so-called peaceful industries. And, of course, no one knew how much industrial capacity remained in Germany, least of all in the Soviet zone."

As with Berlin Reparations Assignment, the author’s personal comments are as, if not more, interesting, than the account of the negotiations. Here are some examples :

It seems remarkable that, despite spending 5 months in Berlin, Cairncross met hardly any Germans: "Contact with the Germans was limited … We knew very little of what was going on inside the minds of the Germans we passed in the street."

For the British and Allied delegations, life was a round of endless parties and opulent living in the officers’ mess where: "As soon as you came into the sitting room, a German Jeeves shimmered in to offer alcoholic nectar and when you returned from the intake of calories in the adjoining dining room he shimmered back again with coffee and brandy. The food was abundant and prepared by a first class chef."

One reason for going was not to see Germany after the war, but because he wanted to meet the Russians at first hand: "People did not talk at that time about an iron curtain. But they were conscious of the segregated world in which the Russians lived and of the clash that had begun to be felt between that world and ours … Russian propaganda in the summer of 1945 had taken a stridently anti-British note while in Britain there was general mistrust of Russia."

"[The British] had found to their consternation, and to the amusement of the Germans, that the balance of power in Europe had been only too successfully overthrown; it promised to be as difficult to make peace with their Russian allies as to defeat their German enemies … To make a slum of Germany, moreover, would be to make her an easy prey to communism and turn the scale against democracy throughout the whole of Western Europe. This would have been the last word in folly: to have cast Germany with open eyes to a totalitarian regime in reparation for a war fought to overthrow another form of totalitarianism."

But despite this Cold War view of the Soviet Union and many other unfavourable comments on the Russians in the books, Cairncross speaks of being on good terms with his opposite numbers in the delegation and how, when he left Berlin shortly before the end of the negotiations: "The Russian team gave me a party when I left Berlin and loaded me with presents of vodka and caviare."

On the contentious issue of whether the Allied negotiators were influenced by commercial considerations; a desire to hold back the recovery of German industry after the war, to make it easier for companies in their own countries to compete in international markets; Cairncross states clearly in ‘The Price of War’ that: "There is no evidence that commercial considerations exercised a decisive influence on British reparations policy in 1945." The overriding factor for the British was a desire to do all they could to prevent future military aggression by Germany.

On the other hand, in ‘A Country to Play With’ he claims that the French and US delegations were influenced by industrialists, out for what they could get:

On the negotiations on steel he refers to: "The presence in Berlin of a number of American steel men … who hoped to boast on their return to the USA that they had settled the future of the German steel industry," and on French proposals to forbid the export by Germany of pharmaceutical products and potash he comments: "In the British view, none of these differences had much to do with security: all of them reflected French commercial interests."

And the British delegation too, not surprisingly, were not immune to commercial pressures: "Even at this late stage departments in Whitehall were still pressing for more severe limitations on German industry. The Ministry of Supply and Aircraft Production was asking for a prohibition of the manufacture of watches and most other precision instruments, partly no doubt in the interests of the newly established British watch and clock industry, partly because of the importance in the Second World War of capacity to make fuses and precision instruments. The dyestuffs industry was said to be basing its plans on the complete elimination of the Germany industry…"

Ratchford and Ross: Berlin Reparations Assignment

19th June 2007

Ratchford and Ross were two economic advisors to the US delegation at the Level of Industry negotiations, which took place in Berlin from September 1945 until the end of March 1946, following on from the Potsdam Agreement between the Allies at the end of the war.

Their book, ‘Berlin Reparations Assignment’, published in 1947, is a critical and highly readable account of the negotiations, written soon after the events described:

"…Ratchford was in Berlin from August 1945, until February, 1946. During most of that time he was Economic Advisor for Level of Industry in the Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.)." He was section chief of a small group that prepared economic data and he also served as economics advisor to the head of the industry branch and to Colonel Draper, the Director of the US Economics Division. Ross was an economist in Ratchford’s office.

The purpose of the negotiations was for the victorious allied powers, Britain, the US, France and the Soviet Union, to agree the level of reparations to be paid by a defeated Germany, and the level of industry which would be permitted in Germany after the war. The two issues were linked. The lower the level of industry permitted, the higher the level of surplus industrial plant and equipment that could be shipped off to the Allies as reparations. At least, that was the theory. In practice it never worked out like that.

The negotiations must have been some of the most fruitless ever conducted. Here is an example from the discussions on footwear. As usual, the Western Allies; the US, Britain and Germany, disagreed with the Soviet Union, in this case on whether the Germans after the war would be permitted 1.9 pairs or 1.2 pairs of shoes per person per year:

"Footwear. In a divided recommendation of the Technical Staff, the American, British and French delegates favored a total annual per capita consumption of 1.9 pairs of shoes per year, of which 0.9 would be of leather. The Soviet delegate favored a total of 1.2 pairs, of which 0.5 would be of leather. Compromises were offered at 1.7 and 1.4 respectively for the totals. The Committee was not able to reach an agreement and the matter was referred to the Directorate of Economics."

There were similar disagreements on just about all industrial goods and commodities.  In the event, the agreement reached in March 1946 was soon discarded and never implemented. As Ratchford and Ross say at the end of their book, writing in 1947:

"The final agreement had been reached only after the hardest kind of negotiating. In order to reach any agreement at all, some of the most difficult problems had been evaded entirely and others had been dealt with in vague, general terms which were capable of varying interpretations…. the operation of the Plan was suspended only a short time after it had been agreed upon. It is doubtful that it will ever by put into operation again, or, if it is, only after substantial changes."

As, if not more interesting than the account of the negotiations, are the descriptions in the book, of Berlin after the war and the attitudes of the US soldiers and administrators. You may wish to compare these with other contemporary accounts of Germany and Berlin after the war which I’ve quoted in this blog, such as the books ‘Berlin Twilight‘ and ‘The Bonfire of Berlin‘ and the films ‘Germany Year Zero‘ and ‘A Defeated People‘. Here are some extracts from ‘Berlin Reparations Assignment’:

"The physical setting in which an international agreement is negotiated is usually of little significance. In this case, however, the weird physical setting and the fantastic economic, political, and social conditions which went with it were so strange and unique that they had a pronounced effect on the personnel and operations of the military government organization within which the reparations plan had to be formulated. Those conditions created an atmosphere so unreal, so nightmarish, so demoralizing that efficient work was almost impossible."

"In 1945 [Berlin] was a fantastic heap of ruins – the prostrate capital of a prostrate nation. One must see the devastation to comprehend it. The traveller who arrived in Berlin by air, only forty-eight hours from undamaged America, was confronted by a sight he is not likely to forget. As his plane circled for a landing at Tempelhof Airfield – almost in the center of the city – the spectacle below hit him almost like a physical blow."

"Great as was the material devastation in Berlin, the human devastation was probably equal to it. The years of war and bombing, the Russian siege and occupation, the separation of families, the high casualty rate in the armed forces, and, in the last year, the uncertainty as to the fate of any who had not been reported killed, the shortages, the lack of jobs, the terrible physical devastation – all of these things had combined to produce a dazed, hungry, scared, bewildered population."

On the other hand:

"The American billets, after light repairs had been made, were usually comfortable and often luxurious…. Two or three servants cared for each house…"

Whilst some US troops and military government staff were conscientious and hard-working: "able, serious-minded men and women who worked hard at their jobs…there were also some who were definite liabilities. They did little themselves and contributed much to the demoralization of the group."

Four types of US soldiers and administrators were identified and described. One group had been sent to Berlin against their will and wanted to get home as quickly as possible. In the meantime they tried to do as little as possible and get as much out of it as they could.

Another group, mainly officers, wanted to get to Berlin, enjoy the experience and take a fling at the black market: "He considered the assignment a vacation and proceeded to celebrate the whole time."

There were also civilian counterparts to these vacationing soldiers: "who just wanted to see Berlin, enjoy the thrill of being part of an occupying force, and experience life in an environment where social customers and restrictions did not bind."

"Finally there were the civilians who were little more than modern carpet baggers… Usually these men knew Germany well… Their chief concern in Berlin was in establishing black market connections and in arranging various trips to various parts of Germany and near-by countries."

For those engaged in black market operations… "drink was in effect free. Drinks were paid for in occupation marks which … were so plentiful that they were hardly considered as money. For example, the price of one pack of American cigarettes in the black market would buy fifty double scotches at the bar."

"Again it should be emphasised that there were plenty of able, conscientious, hard-working people in military government. But the four types described above constituted a sizeable group which did much to break down the morale of the organization."

George Clare – Berlin Days

9th June 2007

George Clare was born in Vienna in 1920 as Georg Klaar, of Austrian Jewish parents.

He escaped to London shortly before the war started, in November 1938. His father went to Paris, as he had been offered a job working for a French bank, but both his father and mother were later killed, trying to escape from France under Nazi occupation.

Berlin Days, published in 1989, describes his time working for British Military Government and the Control Commission in Berlin in 1946-7, firstly as an interpreter, and later, after being naturalised as a British citizen, as an officer, for a group responsible for de-nazification in culture and the media.

After the war he worked for Axel Springer, the German publisher, and became Chief Representative of the organisation in the UK.

The book is not as vivid as some other accounts of Berlin written soon after the events described, such as Berlin Twilight, (see earlier postings), but is still interesting as another personal memoir from a contemporary witness. Here are a few extracts:

Speaking at the start of the book about his parents’ Austrian bourgeois background:

"My parents and their circle’s spiritual and intellectual home was not Judaism but the world of the great thinkers and writers of the German tongue. Indeed, Jews of our kind were not merely passive devotees but active protagonists of Austro-German culture. My father worshipped, never at a synagogue, but almost daily at the altar of German literature. By profession and with his brain he was a banker, but his heart belonged to the German classics, most of all their poetry. His daytime reading was the balance sheet, but in the evening he refreshed himself with Goethe, Schiller, Heine, Eichendorff, Rilke. He knew many of their poems by heart and, when reciting, occasionally slipped in one of his own, some genuinely moving, particularly those he wrote as a young Austrian Army officer during the Great War. This live for German culture was paired with respect, not much short of admiration, for Germany and her achievements. In those days many Austrians, including Jewish ones, did not see in the Germany of the liberal Weimar Republic our country’s ‘big’ but its ‘great’ brother."

On his own first impressions of Berlin in January 1946:

"My most striking first impression was not visual but aural: the muted echoes of a battered city. The 1938 Berlin had assaulted one’s ears with lively and strident crescendos, harsh atonal, high-decibel; a medley of blaring car horns, squeaking brakes, snorting buses, clanging trams, shouting newspaper sellers. But now – like slow eerie drum beats of a danse macabre – each sound rose and remained alone, the clip-clop of often wooden-soled footsteps, the rattle of a handcart or an occasional tram, the chugging of a wood-fuelled bus, the gear-clash of an allied army lorry. This absence of the constant roar of city life was more unsettling than the sight of bombed and shelled buildings, of jagged outlines of broken masonry framing bits of blue sky. I had been prepared for that, but not for a city hushed to a whisper. Yet Berlin was not a lifeless moon-scape. It lived – albeit in something of a zombied trance – mirrored in the dazed looks of many of the people I passed, more often noticeable in men than women. But then the men were mostly old or elderly, bowed and bitter-faced; the few youngish ones who were about – emaciated shadows of the soldiers who had almost conquered an entire continent – looked pathetic and downtrodden in the tattered remnants of their Wehrmacht uniforms. The women were of all ages and, with so many men killed and hundreds of thousands in prisoner-of-war camps, they, not as formerly the Prussian male, dominated the scene."

On the cultural revival of Germany after the war, and his perception of Berlin as a ‘cultural bridge’ between Germany and the western allies:

"One might have expected a spiritual vacuum to follow the collapse of the Third Reich and of the ideologies which had spawned it, but this did not happen. The other Germany, though buried under the pressures of the totalitarian regime, had not fossilised. Freed from the dead-weight of the past, it surfaced again in 1945, slowly at first, but then, with the support of the western allies, at ever-increasing pace. That was the true post-was ‘German miracle’ and it first came to pass in the Berlin of the Golden Hunger Years. In Berlin, still Germany’s capital, still its intellectual and artistic centre the links between the German and the western mind were reforged. Berlin was not only the city of the Luftbrücke, the airlift, but also the Kulturbrücke, the ‘cultural bridge’ between German and the west, the crucial place at a crucial time."

Ivone Kirkpatrick – the Inner Circle

2nd June 2007

Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick was head of chancery at the British embassy in Berlin before the Second World War, head of the German Section at the Foreign Office from 1947 to 1949 and High Commissioner in Germany from 1950 to 1953, before following in the footsteps of Sir William Strang, to become Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office from 1953-7.

‘The Inner Circle’, published in 1959, is the title of his autobiography. Originally I thought the title implied a group of people – senior politicians, diplomats, administrators and army officers – who effectively governed the country. In fact it means nothing of the kind. As the introduction to the book explains, the ‘Inner Circle’ is a reference to the London Underground railway, and refers to a Foreign Office saying that "once a man was launched on the Inner Circle (London, Paris, Berlin, Rome) it was impossible to leave the track." This shows how, despite the Empire, British diplomats between the wars still saw Europe as the centre of the world. Ivone Kirkpatrick worked in London, Rome and Berlin, though not in Paris.

He was born in India in 1897 and spent the first 7 years of his life there. His family were catholic Irish from Limerick, and he was related to Lord Hardinge, who was his cousin and Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office in 1918. He joined the army in the First World War and was wounded in Gallipoli. He then joined the Foreign Office and after postings in Brazil and Rome, joined the British embassy in Berlin in September 1933. He attended many of the meetings between Chamberlain and Hitler, which took place before the war, including Munich, as a British observer and record taker.

In 1944 he worked for the embryonic Control Commission for Germany and Austria, where he "was responsible for the constitution and preparation of the British element in Austria" (At the time Major General Kirby was his counterpart for Germany).

In an interesting aside, he says that he declined to accompany the Control Commission to Germany in 1945 (for reasons that are not explained) and "Sir William Strang was appointed to take my place." Strang’s post was political advisor to the Military Governor, Field Marshal Montgomery. Other sources suggest that Kirkpatrick was himself considered for the top post, before a decision was taken to appoint Montgomery, a soldier rather than a diplomat, as Military Governor of the British Zone.

Instead, Kirkpatrick was appointed as the British political advisor to General Eisenhower at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) in Frankfurt for a brief period, until SHAEF was dissolved in July 1945.

It is interesting to see how themes I’ve seen in other memoirs and contemporary accounts re-occur. Here are some examples:

Firstly, another case of someone who was influenced by early experiences in Germany. Yvone Kirkpatrick relates how, in 1910 as a thirteen year old boy, he spent the summer holidays with his mother in the Black Forest in Germany. For Sunday lunch: "the meal was adorned by a Sunday menu which depicted German troops advancing to the attack on a French position, whilst Zeppelins hovering in the air showered bombs on the defeated enemy. The unpleasant impression produced by this weekly manifestation was reinforced by the remarks which the German children staying in the hotel let fall from time to time. They told us with the frank malice of the young that England was decadent and that Germany would be obliged within a short time to strip us of our overseas possessions."

Secondly, Kirkpatrick’s first impressions of Germany after the war, which show the same combination revealed in other contemporary accounts, of astonishment at the scale of destruction, and the idyllic, even luxurious, existence for many of the occupying forces:

"I flew to British headquarters at Bad Oeynhausen with Strang. There we parted, he to go to Berlin and I to Frankfurt. Germany was then an astonishing sight. Everything which modern man considers necessary to the maintenance of life in a civilised society had disappeared. There was no governmental authority, no police. No trains, trams or cars; no factories working, no postal service, no telephones, no newspapers, no banks. No shop was open and it would have been impossible to buy a loaf of bread, a glass of beer or an aspirin. Every bridge was blown and the available rolling-stock could be seen marooned between the ruins. In the Rhine hundreds of sunken craft shown their upper works whilst the giant bridges lay collapsed in the river-bed. In the countryside the sudden departure of the foreign labourers had halted agricultural work. I saw one aged women trying to cut an enormous cornfield with a hand sickle. The only sign of life was provided by hundreds of thousands of Germans on foot trekking in all directions. It was as if a giant ant-heap had suddenly been disturbed. Motoring from Bad Oeynhausen to Frankfurt, I stopped at the side of the autobahn to lunch with my driver off a K-ration. As we were sitting in the shade, I beheld the approach of a sad little procession, A middle-aged man was pushing a perambulator laden with suitcases and household effects. Behind him limped a footsore woman and two children. I walked down the road and asked him who he was and where he was going. He told me that he was a bank manager at Paderborn and that he had taken refuge near the Chiemsee on the Austrian border. He had, however, heard that although his bank had been destroyed, the cellar was habitable. So he was walking back from the Chiemsee to Paderborn. At the point at which I met him he had completed three-quarters of his 500-mile walk. It was fortunate that this great migration was blessed by abnormally fine weather.

At Frankfurt I lodged with Air Marshal Tedder in a charming villa in the Taunus mountains overlooking the city. After the turmoil of war it was an idyllic existence. In the morning I drove down to the giant I.G. Farben building which had been fitted out as General Eisenhower’s headquarters. We all lunched in the Mess at Frankfurt and in the evening returned to the fresh, almost Alpine air of our mountain retreat. There was very little social life, which was a blessing, but a number of interesting people came to stay. Amongst these was Prince Bernadotte, who gave me an account of Himmler’s efforts during the closing months of the war to use him as an intermediary for the conclusion of a separate peace with the Western Allies."

Thirdly and lastly, an interesting comment on the impact of the Korean War in 1950:

"The impact of this event on Germany was tremendous. It was felt that the Korean war was only a curtain raiser to a Russian-sponsored war of unification in Germany. There was a wave of panic and many sought to re-insure with the Russians. Some Ruhr industrialists, for example, began to place advertisements in the Communist newspapers. In North-Rhine-Westphalia, the Minister of the Interior removed the numbers from police uniforms because experience showed that policemen were unwilling to act against Communists for fear of identification.

It is difficult now to recapture the atmosphere of those days. Only 4 weak Anglo-American divisions and practically no air force stood between the Channel ports and the 22 Soviet divisions poised a few miles from our zonal boundary. I can remember an experienced American correspondent telling me that he was convinced that it was only a matter of weeks or even days before the Russians struck. In Berlin and in frontier towns like Hamburg the attitude of the public was robust, but elsewhere foodstuffs were hoarded and preparations made for flight. Any unusual noise was thought to be the sound of approaching Russian artillery fire."

The Bonfire of Berlin – a lost childhood in wartime Germany

29th May 2007

Last week I wrote about the film ‘Germany Year Zero’ made in 1947 by the Italian neo-realist film director, Roberto Rossellini, and asked if life for a young child in Berlin, at the end of the war, was really as bad as shown in the film?

Helga Schneider was born in November 1937. She was deserted by her mother (who joined the SS and became a concentration camp guard) in 1941 and was brought up by her father and stepmother. In "The Bonfire of Berlin" she tells the story of her lost childhood. Her stepmother couldn’t cope with her and she was sent, firstly to a mental institution, which she hated but survived, and then to a boarding school, which she loved. At the end of 1944, when she was still only 7 years old, she returned to Berlin and spent the closing months of the war with her stepmother’s family. Most of the time was spent sheltering from the bombs in the cellar of the apartment block where they lived.

The subject of my studies is the British Occupation of Germany after the war, and the British make only a very brief appearance in this book. But how can an historian understand one set of sources, such as the official papers of the British Military Government and Control Commission, the memoirs of British officials, or the British Zone Review, without also reading memoirs and contemporary accounts written by those on the other side? For example, if you read my earlier posting on the debate in the British Zone Review on Feeing Sorry for the Germans‘, read it again, after you’ve read this posting.

In keeping with the approach in this blog of letting sources ‘speak for themselves’ here are a few extracts from Helga Schneider’s book:

Firstly, on being caught by a bombing raid just outside the door of their house, in the Autumn of 1944, when her Aunt Hilde was bringing her back to Berlin from her boarding school:

"We had almost reached the door of the house when a woman ran towards us shouting, ‘Get away from here. Run to the shelter. They’re coming!’

I looked up and saw a triangle of low-flying planes followed by other triangles; at the same time a chorus of wailing sirens went up. My heart leapt into my throat: the sirens had sounded too late, the planes had already begun firing, and all hell broke loose. I was short of breath and thought I would collapse. Then a powerful blast of air hurled me against the door. Feeling as though I was falling into a deep ravine, I lost consciousness.

When I came to, I found myself lying on the ground with a loud roaring in my ears. Everything around me seemed to be flying through the air, fragments of brick, bits of tarmac, pieces of wood… I saw Hilde lying at the door, arms slack, eyes closed, with a trickle of blood running slowly from her hairline to the corner of her mouth. She looked as if she was dead. The roaring was still all around us, and as I burst into terrified tears, a lashing rain of rubble crashed down on me like a hurricane. My mouth and nostrils filled with dust and sand, and I felt I was suffocating. I spat earth, blood and bits of brick…. I reached Hilde and stared at her in astonishment, touching her chin gently. Suddenly she opened her eyes and gazed at me vacantly, murmuring, ‘What happened?’ Then her face sprang to life: ‘Oh my God, are you injured?’

‘I don’t know …’ I looked at my hands, my arms. There was blood. I was horrified. I choked back my nausea. Suddenly Hilde whispered, ‘Please don’t turn round…’ But I turned round straight away and saw her. The woman who had shouted ‘Run to the shelter!’ She was lying not far from us in a pool of blood, headless. I vomited. I vomited my guts up. I vomited up all the horror at the world."

Unlike the headless woman, both Helga and her Aunt Hilde were only slightly injured.

Secondly on the effects of hunger:

"We lived like moles in the cellar, numb and drained by inactivity. We waited. Our minds grew dull. Sometimes we behaved like animals.

One day Egon [another boy in the cellar] was gnawing on a miserable stump of bread his mother had given him. He was sitting on a stool, holding the bread in both hands, and the grinding of his teeth became so insistent that I became absurdly annoyed, Then a strange thing happened. My brother, who had been curled up in a corner with Teddy, worryingly downcast and apathetic as usual, suddenly leapt to his feet and jumped on Egon to take the bread from him. Something bestial was unleashed within me. Rather than separate the two of them, I joined the fray. It was as though my mind had blocked out everything apart from the absolute need to get hold of that piece of bread. As though hypnotised, I laid into those two little boys and, when I finally pulled the bread from Egon’s fist, dashed upstairs as though the Devil was after me. I reached the first landing and stopped panting…. Crouching in a low, gaping window, I devoured the bread, gnawing at it like a ravenous rodent. After swallowing the last crumb, I felt as though I was waking from a horrible dream. Only then did I realise what I had done. I was so upset that I started crying, not with remorse but with profound anxiety. Hunger had turned me into an animal!"

Thirdly, on what happened on two occasions when the victorious Russian soldiers discovered the group hiding in their cellar. The first time a soldier asked her if she was hungry. When she answered yes: "The Russian said something to one of the other men, who slipped a loaf of black bread out of a knapsack and handed it to me." After they left, the loaf was cut into slices and shared between everyone in the cellar. "We consumed our slices slowly, relishing every last crumb. I thought I had never eaten anything so exquisite."

A few days later, two drunken Russian solders found their way into the cellar and raped two of the girls there, in full sight of everyone. One of the girls, Erika, was ill with tuberculosis. "It had never until that moment occurred to me that a man might take the slightest interest in such a shadow of a girl. Erika stared at the Russian and turned white as a sheet. She started trembling, and her coughs mingled with her tears … I tried to take my eyes off the horrible spectacle but I couldn’t. What I saw was unimaginable, cruel, unjust …"

Erika never recovered. "It was as though her body, shattered by the horrible abuse to which she had been subjected, had succumbed to her illness, Struggling against a terrible breathlessness, lips bloodless and eyes vacant, she coughed and spat blood into a tin bowl someone had brought to her."

The following day, concerned that she was losing blood, Erika’s mother found a doctor who examined her as they all gathered round her bed: "Eventually Erika looked up at us one by one, smiled weakly and murmured, ‘Thank you.’ Then her lips tensed, her eyelids grew heavy, a long shudder ran through her body, and a drop of blood appeared at the corner of her mouth, like a tiny rosebud. She gripped her mother’s hand and kissed it. But the kiss stiffened, and she died biting her mother’s fingers."

A few days later, they heard the news on the radio that Berlin had surrendered and the war was over: "There was an explosion of jubilation, tears of disbelief flowed down our faces, Euphoria, kisses, tears…. All of a sudden everything was erased: quarrels, insults, meanness and intolerance, malice and vulgar jokes, sullenness, a lack of solidarity, of sensitivity, of humanity. The cellar could not contain our happiness and we rushed into the street…. Surrender had turned us into human beings again, sanctioning the first of our rights, the right to hope. We weren’t just survivors, we were new people…."

"But what was Berlin like now? It was an expanse of burning ruins whose glow turned night to day. A limitless bonfire with a residue of humanity enduring the most catastrophic conditions in its belly. The streets were packed with corpses that stank to the heavens; the water shortage had turned the city into an open-air latrine. For a long time there had been no electricity, or gas, or water, or heating, or any distribution of food or medicine; the sewers were paralysed. Infectious diseases raged, so lice, bugs and rats reigned supreme….

"The cellar was hastily cleared, and the mattresses were carried back up into the block. The suitcases returned to the flats, this time forever… I gazed around the empty space where we had lived crammed on top of one another, piled up like beasts, intruding on our neighbours with our smells, our bad tempers, our selfishness. We had passed beyond what was endurable, what was imaginable; we had passed beyond our strength, beyond humanity. Yet we were to learn that our suffering was nothing compared with what had happened to the Jews in the concentration camps."

Helga Schneider was fortunate. Her father survived the war and the family left Berlin in Spring 1947 to go, first to a refugee camp in Lubeck and then to Austria. In 1963 she moved to live in Italy.

In 1971 she found her mother again and went to visit her with her son, Renzo, but her mother showed no remorse for abandoning her daughter, nor for her Nazi past:

"My blood froze. If she, in 1941, had decided that she didn’t want her daughter, it was my turn not to want my mother! My son and I took the first train back to Italy. Renzo wept with disappointment. How could I explain why I hadn’t found a mother, and he hadn’t found a grandmother? He was only five years old…. So I lost my mother for the second time."

She never saw her mother again until 1998, when she received a call from her retirement home, asking her to come and visit. Her book ‘Let me Go – My Mother and the SS‘ is a record of that meeting.

Germany Year Zero

20th May 2007

Last week I saw the film ‘Germany Year Zero’ made in 1947 by the Italian neo-realist film director, Roberto Rossellini.

The British Film Institute has been showing a major retrospective of his films at the BFI South Bank. To quote the programme notes:

“Of the great film-makers who emerged in Italy after WW2, Roberto Rossellini (1906-1977) was by far the most innovative. With [two of his earlier films]  ‘Rome Open City’ in 1945 and ‘Paisa’ in 1946 he created, out of almost nothing, the new realist cinema that others were only cautiously dreaming about.”

On ‘Germany Year Zero’ the notes describe the film as:

“An underrated masterpiece, whose unsparing attitude did not fit into the prevailing mood of optimism at the time it came out.”

‘Germany Year Zero’ was made in 1947 and released in 1948. It was an Italian / French / German co-production, which in itself is interesting for the time. The actors were German, the production staff Italian and the distributors French.

The film tells a grim story. The programme notes even go so far as to call it a "horror movie" which is not correct, but you can see what they mean.

It tells the story of a young boy, Edmund, around 13 years old, living with his sick father, older sister and brother, in the ruins of Berlin at the end of the war. Many of the most striking shots in the film are those of the ruined city; the streets remarkably clean, but with the rubble swept into mounds along the edges, in front of the empty shells of the ruined buildings, as if it were snow after a particularly fierce blizzard. At one point a starving crowd gathers round a dead horse and start cutting off pieces of the meat to eat.

Edmund and his family live in a cramped apartment with at least two other families. His father is sick and unable to work and his older brother will not leave the apartment because he was a soldier who fought to the end of the war and is afraid he will be sent to prison. This leaves Edmund trying to earn enough to feed to entire family, without much success. He is sent home from work digging graves because he is too young. The owner of the apartment sends him out to sell weighing scales, the only thing they have left of any value, on the black market, which Edmund exchanges for a tin of meat. He joins a group of other young children living rough in the ruins stealing what they can and cheating others on the black market.

Eventually, stung by the constant complaints from his sick father that they would all be better off if he were dead, as a sick man is only a burden and an extra mouth to feed, and after meeting his former schoolteacher who reminded him of the Nazi doctrine that only the strong survive, and the weak go to the wall, Edmund steals a bottle of poison from the hospital, slips it into his father’s tea, and so kills him. Soon after this Edmund himself comes to a tragic end; a lost soul, without hope, in a world without meaning or morality.

The British, American and French occupying forces are barely evident in the film. They make an appearance on only a couple of occasions; French soldiers chat to the girls in the night-club Edmund’s sister goes to; British soldiers are shown as tourists visiting the spot where Hitler’s and Eva Braun’s bodies were supposed to have been burnt after they committed suicide; and later another two British soldiers are shown paying good money on the black market to buy a gramophone record of some of Hitler’s speeches.

To a modern viewer, the obvious question is: “were things really this bad – after all this is a feature film, not a documentary?”

After reading some other memoirs and contemporary accounts such as ‘Berlin Twilight’ (see my earlier posting), Humphrey Jennings’ documentary film ‘A Defeated People’ (discussed extensively on other postings in this blog) and Helga Schneider’s ‘The Bonfire of Berlin” (about which more next week), you have to come to the conclusion that for some people, if not for everyone, they probably were.